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  Chapter 10 
Federal Influences and  
Intergovernmental relations:  
Constraints, Conflicts, and Benefits
Clive S. Thomas and Michael L. Boyer
Much of what Alaska’s state government does, and much of what it is unable to do, are 
influenced by other governments, particularly the federal government. Local governments 
across the state, as well as Alaska Native governments, also play a role. Consequently, the 
character of Alaska politics, the political issues that arise, and the day-to-day operations 
of state government are, in significant ways, a product of these ongoing relations with 
other governments. Issues such as the opening of the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge 
(ANWR) for oil and gas development, subsistence hunting and fishing rights, commer-
cial and sports fishing, the funding and delivery of K–12 education, aspects of health 
and welfare, economic development, and transportation policies, among many others, 
involve some form of intergovernmental relations (IGR). In this chapter we delve into the 
formal structures and the political aspects of IGR as they affect Alaska.
Because of its central importance to Alaska politics and government, aspects of IGR 
are dealt with in other places in the book. Chapter 9 deals with federal-state-local gov-
ernment–Native government interactions primarily as they affect the Native community; 
Chapter 18 focuses on state-local IGR; and the policy chapters in Parts IV and V deal with 
IGR from their particular policy perspectives. This chapter provides a foundation for these 
later chapters by explaining the basics of IGR, describing its formal structure, emphasiz-
ing its political aspects, and examining the role of the federal government as it relates to 
Alaska, both legally and politically. Throughout the chapter we acknowledge that the feder-
al-state relationship places some constraints on Alaska and its policy makers and certainly 
involves them in many conflicts. But we also assert that the state-federal relationship pro-
vides major benefits to Alaska and to the vast majority of its citizens, even though many of 
these benefits may not be readily apparent, fully understood, or appreciated. 
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The chapter begins with an explanation of IGR and how it relates to federalism. Next 
we consider the structure of Alaska’s current IGR system and what has shaped it, followed 
by an overview of the development of Alaska’s IGR. We then look at perspectives on the 
Alaska-federal relationship from Alaskan, federal, and holistic viewpoints. Next we con-
sider the day-to-day politics of IGR, followed by a discussion of Alaska’s IGR compared 
with that in other states. The conclusion offers a balance sheet of the constraints, conflicts, 
and benefits involved in Alaska’s IGR, particularly as it relates to the federal government.1 
1. THE BASICS OF FEDERALISM AND INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS
We begin by explaining IGR and federalism and identifying their similarities and 
differences. This section also includes observations on the evolving nature of federalism 
over the years, raises the question of whether there is one “correct” interpretation of fed-
eralism, as some people argue, and offers observations on the problems with viewing the 
federal government as a governmental, administrative, and political monolith. 
Comparing Federalism and IGr: a Legal and Constitutional relationship  
versus Day-to-Day Interactions
When the American Founding Fathers met in Philadelphia in the summer of 1787 
to revise the previously adopted Articles of Confederation, one of their challenges was 
to give more authority to the national government while continuing to allow the states 
extensive control over their own affairs. Although they did not purposely intend to cre-
ate a new form of government, the solution they devised was, in fact, a new form and 
one of America’s contributions to governance. They initially called this new form a “con-
federal” system because they saw it as a variation of the system under the Articles of 
Confederation, but it soon became known as federalism.
In a federal system, legal sovereignty—the ultimate power to make laws and thus 
public policies—is divided between the national government (often referred to as the 
federal government) and several constituent governments, those that together comprise 
the nation as a whole (usually referred to as states or provinces). Theoretically, each level 
of government has its own sphere of authority. Federal systems, such as those in the 
United States, Australia, and Germany, are contrasted with unitary political systems in 
which legal sovereignty is held by the central government, as in France, Norway, and New 
Zealand. 
The formal provisions of federalism are typically set out in a national constitution 
and generally do not include provisions for local government. This is the case in the U.S. 
Constitution. As a result, each state determines the form of local government and the 
authority these governments will exercise. Local governments are, however, part of IGR.
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Since 1787 the constitutional-legal relationships that form American federalism have 
led to many political consequences. These legal and political developments shaped not 
only federal-state relations, but also the relations of the states with other governments, 
including local governments and the governments of other states.2 Besides the states and 
the federal government, according to the U.S. Census Bureau, there were 89,004 local 
governments of various types across the nation in 2012.3 There are also interstate com-
pacts and regional governmental arrangements as well as organizations bringing together 
the states and local governments for a variety of purposes. For this reason, the most infor-
mative way to view federal-state relations is as part of the comprehensive and dynamic 
perspective of intergovernmental relations. IGR embraces both the legal and political 
ongoing relationships of various levels and types of governments. The day-to-day inter-
actions of a state government like Alaska’s may include those with other states, local gov-
ernments, Native governments, unofficially with foreign governments, as well as with the 
federal government. Plus, the federal government has direct relations with Alaska’s local 
and Native governments that do not involve state government. 
While IGR is based primarily on legal relationships and involves much intergovern-
mental cooperation, it also produces many conflicts. The origin and development of these 
conflicts have much to do with the political development of federalism.  
the Legal and political Odyssey of american Federalism 
The relationship between the federal government and the states, particularly regard-
ing legal jurisdiction, has been a source of continuing and often heated debate since 1787. 
This is because conflict between the national and constituent governments is inherent in a 
federal system. The root of the conflict and the continual debate regarding federalism lies 
in a combination of factors. One is that the general way the federal-state relationship is set 
out in the U.S. Constitution (mainly in Article 1, Section 8, and in the Tenth Amendment) 
makes the relationship subject to various legal interpretations. A second is the varying 
views of the role of government among segments of American society. A third factor 
is that, particularly in the twentieth century, there was a substantial increase in federal 
authority resulting from wars, economic crises (like the New Deal response to the Great 
Depression in the 1930s), the promotion of civil and minority rights, as well as programs 
to enhance economic and personal welfare (such as Social Security and Medicare for 
senior citizens, and Medicaid for those with low incomes), and environmental protection, 
among other increases in federal authority. The upshot of this combination of develop-
ments has been increased conflict between the federal government and the states. 
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Is there One Definitive and “Correct” Federal-State relationship? 
A repeated theme of Republican Dan Sullivan’s successful bid to unseat Alaska’s 
Democratic U.S. Senator Mark Begich in the November 2014 election was that there was 
far too much “federal overreach” in Alaska. This buzz phrase has become the rallying cry 
of those who oppose what they see as increasing and unwarranted federal interference in 
the business of the states. Concern about federal overreach is an important part of the Tea 
Party movement that emerged across the country after the 2008 elections, and is shared 
by many right-wing Republicans and some libertarians. This overreach is considered so 
serious by many Alaska politicians that in 2015 the Republican-dominated state senate 
passed a resolution to establish a committee to look into this issue as they perceived it. 
The resolution also requested the governor to set up a working group to consider estab-
lishing a permanent state office or authority to protect state sovereignty. 
Many supporters of this perspective argue that America should return to the original 
intentions of the Founding Fathers regarding the Constitution in general, and federalism 
in particular. This contention assumes that the founders’ intentions regarding federalism 
can be precisely determined. Yet it is very unclear, indeed very much in dispute, exactly 
what America’s founders envisioned. They even disagreed among themselves, as epito-
mized in the classic clash between Alexander Hamilton and Thomas Jefferson. Hamilton 
favored the prominence of the national government and Jefferson that of the states, though 
Jefferson became rather Hamiltonian in his views after he became president. Historians 
and others have written thousands of pages about this dispute over the “correct” interpre-
tation of the Constitution with no generally accepted definitive conclusion. 
Even if the founders’ intentions could be definitively determined, it is worth contem-
plating the following question: Would the federal-state relationship of 1787 in a country of 
fewer than four million people (about 20 percent of whom were slaves or indentured ser-
vants) and with only thirteen states, be appropriate today, well over two hundred years later, 
in a country of nearly 320 million people and fifty states in a vastly changed world, where 
nuclear weapons have replaced muskets, multinational corporations have supplanted the 
single merchant, and minority groups of all types are more or less fully enfranchised? 
The debate about the “correct” federal-state relationship raises many questions, but 
none of them can be answered definitively. The often heated clashes of values and ideol-
ogy regarding what is the proper role of government are largely the result of differences 
between what various people, groups, and interests see as their own respective economic, 
legal, and political gains and losses from various forms of federal-state relations. 
From a practical perspective, at any one time political power determines the relation-
ship. Who is in power in Washington, D.C., including the political complexion of the U.S. 
Supreme Court, is a major determining factor. Plus, the enormous financial resources 
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of the federal government and the importance of federal funds and intergovernmental 
transfers to all fifty states give the federal government major political leverage in the rela-
tionship. These dynamics give rise to the politics of fiscal federalism—broadly defined as 
the politics surrounding federal intergovernmental transfer payments. 
To put things in perspective, over the years both federal and state authority has 
increased considerably from the laissez faire days of nineteenth century America to the 
proactive governments following the New Deal. Relatively, however, federal authority has 
increased more than that of the states. This increase has intensified the conflict in feder-
al-state relations and has directly and indirectly affected the broader nexus of IGR. This 
has certainly been the case in Alaska.
the Federal Government Is Not a Governmental and political Monolith
A final introductory point that is useful to bear in mind is that, like Alaska state gov-
ernment, and indeed all levels of governments in a democracy, the federal government is 
not a political, governmental, and administrative monolith united in its actions and poli-
cies—far from it. This is not the impression one might get from many Alaskans and their 
politicians who often refer to “the federal government” (whether in praise or in criticism) 
as if it spoke with one voice. 
A much more realistic and accurate understanding of Alaska-federal relations is 
gained by realizing that, while on occasion the federal government can act in a united and 
forceful fashion, it is often divided within itself. The many departments, agencies, and 
divisions within the federal government are often in conflict among themselves over pol-
icies. One department, agency, or elected or appointed federal official may favor a policy 
while others oppose it. A state that wants to succeed in reaping benefits from the federal 
government realizes this and exploits these divisions to its advantage whenever possible. 
2. ALASKA’S CONTEMPORARY IGR: INFLUENCES ON THE SYSTEM
Turning to the specifics of Alaska’s IGR system, the following six factors have been 
particularly important in determining both its formal structure and its political interac-
tions: (1) constitutional and legal provisions, (2) a pervasive federal presence, (3) other 
external political and economic forces, (4) the fusion of elements of Alaska political cul-
ture with aspects of its political rhetoric, (5) Alaska’s revenue bonanza, and (6) the role 
of Alaska Natives. 
Federal and State Constitutional and Legal provisions
Of particular note in the U.S. Constitution is the so-called Supremacy Clause con-
tained in Article VI, Section 2. This provides that the constitution, statutes, and treaties of 
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the U.S. government are the “supreme law of the land.” So long as the federal provisions 
are within the authority of the federal government to adopt, they will take precedence 
over state laws that are in conflict with them. 
Also noteworthy, for purposes of IGR, is Article I, Section 8, which gives the federal 
government sole authority to deal with “Indian Tribes.” Section 10 of that article prohibits 
the states from making treaties with foreign countries but allows them to make compacts 
with other states with approval of Congress. Article IV, Section 1, provides that each state 
shall give “full faith and credit” to the laws and judicial proceedings of other states, and 
Section 2 of that article, the Privileges and Immunities Clause, requires each state to treat 
citizens of other states on an equal basis with its own residents. 
The most important provision of the Alaska Constitution regarding IGR is Article X, 
which establishes Alaska’s local government system. Alaska statutes set out provisions for 
local government in Title 29.
Judicial interpretations of these constitutional provisions have also shaped Alaska’s 
IGR. A notable decision affecting the state’s relationship with Alaska Natives was the 
U.S. Supreme Court decision in Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie Tribal Government, 
which denied the existence of Indian Country in Alaska and Native sovereignty over 
land.4 Similarly, the Alaska Supreme Court has determined in several cases whether a 
state statute takes precedence over a local ordinance. Federal and state statutes also fill 
in the details of these constitutional provisions. Several federal laws affect federal-Alaska 
Native and state-Native relations.    
a pervasive Federal presence
Federal influence in shaping Alaska’s IGR is based on four major factors. First, the 
federal government is a major landholder, with about 55 percent under its ownership, and 
it controls what happens on this land in terms of activities and development.5 Second, the 
federal government is a major regulator of a range of activities from rules relating to envi-
ronmental protection to those regarding access to government buildings by the disabled. 
Third, federal relations with Alaska Natives have a major effect on Alaska’s IGR system. 
Fourth, federal influence on IGR also comes from its major economic impact. As 
Chapter 6 on the Alaska economy explains, part of this comes from its presence as an 
employer in the state. The federal government’s role in fiscal federalism is also significant. 
As Chapter 8 explains in the context of state revenues, the federal government is a major 
source of state general funds. Some federal monies also go directly to local governments, 
to Native governments, and to nonprofit organizations.   
Other external political and economic Forces
Besides the federal government, other external forces influence the politics of Alaska’s 
IGR. American public opinion, often manifested through the national media and national 
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interest groups (particularly environmental groups like the Sierra Club), shapes national 
policy, which often places constraints on Alaska’s use of resources. Federal designation of 
the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge (ANWR) as off limits to oil development is an exam-
ple of a federal policy spurred by national public opinion. Such constraints limit state 
revenues, as well as sometimes limiting state and local government policy, particularly 
regarding economic development. This situation exacerbates state-federal conflicts.  
More indirectly, the decisions of multinational companies—particularly those in oil 
and mining—to operate in Alaska and the extent to which they wish to operate, plus the 
world price of natural resources, over which Alaska has no control, crucially affect state 
revenues and thus the all-important element of funding for the IGR system. Colonialism 
may no longer exist as it relates to Alaska, but the financial dependence of Alaska on 
external capital and business decisions made in capitals far away means that its political 
options, and thus the effectiveness of its IGR system, are not always determined in Alaska 
or even in the United States.
the Fusion of elements of alaska political Culture with aspects of Its political rhetoric 
As noted in Chapter 5, Alaska’s political culture is complex. It manifests elements 
of communalism and traditionalism, but mainly individualism, often expressed in fiscal 
conservatism and sometimes in libertarianism. These attitudes exist within the reality of 
a political economy long shaped by economic dependence on out-of-state businesses and 
on federal and state government. This clash between values and reality has been recon-
ciled, to some degree, by a strong strain of political pragmatism. In this regard, Alaska 
reflects the political cultural paradox common in many western states, which touts indi-
vidualism and self-help while, out of necessity, living off the largesse of government.6 
Hence, Chapter 5 describes Alaska’s political culture as manifesting pragmatic dependent 
individualism. 
Among some Alaskans and some Alaska politicians, dependence and the constraints 
that often accompany it generate a populist perception of Alaskans as underdogs (in 
some cases even victims), particularly regarding the federal government and national 
and international forces. Some other Alaskans are either unaware of the paradox between 
dependence and individualism, or they simply deny any need for government or any 
dependence on it. In combination, these feelings often result in a political rhetoric that 
manifests these myths and contradictions and is sometimes translated into political 
action and policy. Examples of the fusion of elements of these traits of culture and politi-
cal rhetoric and their effect on Alaska’s IGR are considered later in this chapter. 
alaska’s revenue Bonanza
The unprecedented state revenues from oil and gas production in the ten years fol-
lowing the opening of the trans-Alaska pipeline system (TAPS) in 1977 enabled the state 
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government to bankroll local governments in significant amounts, including funding for 
numerous capital projects and providing much of their operating funds. This high level 
of funding was not directed just to rural-bush governments. Urban governments also 
received large sums from the state through direct appropriations and programs such as 
municipal revenue sharing. As a result, local communities had less need to tax their res-
idents and, in many cases, even reduced property and other taxes. But beginning with 
the drop in oil revenues in 1986 and continuing with their subsequent fluctuations, the 
state drastically cut its financial assistance to municipalities. These cuts have significantly 
affected the politics of state-local IGR. 
the Influence of alaska Natives
The significant role of Alaska Natives in Alaska politics is covered in Chapter 9. Here 
we summarize their influence on Alaska’s IGR.
 Historically, the Native influence stems partly from the fact that agriculture is not 
possible on the bulk of Alaska lands. Consequently, there was no reason to remove Natives 
so that white settlers could farm the land, as was the case in many other states. In addi-
tion, by the time Alaska was colonized, a period of atonement toward Native Americans 
was underway in the United States. This explains why the reservation system never took 
root in Alaska. As a result, many Alaska Natives still live where they have always lived in 
rural-bush areas. 
This means that Alaska’s demographics set it apart from the other forty-nine states. 
While the rural population in all other states is predominantly white and nonindigenous, 
over half the population of rural-bush Alaska in 2010 were Alaska Natives.7 About half 
the state’s 250 communities are Native communities. All these Native communities are 
located in rural-bush areas, and most are entirely Alaska Native in population, including 
the bulk of the state’s 112 second-class cities.
In addition, there is a parallel Native local government system under federal law 
stemming from the Native community’s relationship with the national government, plus 
a range of for-profit and nonprofit organizations at both the regional and local (village) 
level that have an impact on Alaska’s IGR system. Most important is the right of tribes 
to adopt constitutions for self-government and to set up corporations under federal law 
to aid in tribal economic development. The nonprofit Native associations provide many 
services, particularly various types of social programs, and both the State of Alaska and 
the federal government interact with these organizations in several ways.  
In combination, these factors mean that the Alaska Native community is a significant 
participant in the state’s IGR system. 
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3. ALASKA’S CONTEMPORARY IGR: THE STRUCTURE AND INTERACTIONS OF  
    A MULTIFACETED SYSTEM
The influences just considered produce a particular structure of Alaska’s IGR system 
with some unique features compared with other states. Because of the existence of Alaska 
Native governments within the state that are not on federal reservations, Alaska has a 
dual IGR system, one of federal-state-local relations and one of relations of the federal, 
state, and local governments with Native governments. In particular, it is the relations 
between the state and its local governments with Native governments that give Alaska’s 
IGR system its dual characteristic. 
The nexus of Alaska’s current formal interaction with various governments is set out 
in Figure 10.1. This shows that there are four levels of interaction in Alaska’s IGR activi-
ties: federal, state, local, and regional. Various aspects of the web of IGR are explained in 
detail in this chapter and in other chapters.8 To provide a holistic perspective, however, 
we supplement Figure 10.1 with a brief explanation of the various levels of Alaska’s IGR 
system in Box 10.1.
 FIGUre 10.1 
alaska and the Nexus of Intergovernmental relations
NatIONaL/ 
FeDeraL LeVeL
reGIONaL/ 
SUBreGIONaL LeVeL
State 
LeVeL
LOCaL 
LeVeL
National 
Organizations 
and Compacts of 
the Fifty States
Western and Pacific
Northwest Regional
Organizations and
Compacts of States
The Other Forty-nine
State Governments
Alaska’s 
Washington D.C. 
Governor’s Office
Alaska Local Governments:
Boroughs, cities,
special districts
Alaska Native Governments
and Organizations:
Regional corporations,  
local corporations, IRAs
Source: Developed by the authors.
Alaska State Government: 
Legislature, governor
and state agencies,
and the courts
Western Regional
and Alaska Offices of
Federal Agencies
Federal Government:
Congress, president and executive 
agencies, and the courts
Major Relationships
Secondary RelationshipsKeY
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 BOX 10.1 
types and Levels of alaska’s  
Intergovernmental relations (IGr)
FEDERAL, STATE, AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT IGR
Federal-State Relations
These interactions revolve around federal funds 
flowing into the state; federal agency operations in 
Alaska, such as the U.S. Forest Service; enforce-
ment of federal regulations, such as air and water 
quality; and disputes over federal versus state 
sovereignty and rights, such as over subsistence. 
Alaska presses its cause with the federal govern-
ment through its congressional delegation, the 
governor’s office in Washington, D.C., and visits 
by state officials. Despite the emphasis on conflict, 
often stressed in the media, and anti-federal rhet-
oric of many Alaska politicians, the major aspect of 
federal-state relations is cooperation.   
Federal-Local Relations
Since the 1960s, direct IGR between the fed-
eral government and Alaska local governments 
has been increasing. Again, the major connection 
is funding. For instance, some Community Devel-
opment Block Grants from the U.S. Department 
of Housing and Urban Development go directly to 
local governments, as do some Federal Aviation 
Administration funds for airports, and Department 
of Transportation funds for local public transport, 
such as purchasing new buses. Many local govern-
ments, particularly the larger ones, like Anchorage, 
Fairbanks, and Juneau, lobby for funds and other 
benefits in Washington, D.C. 
State-Local Relations
This relationship also mainly revolves around 
money, particularly funding of local government 
services and local capital projects by the state. Local 
governments are among the most prominent and 
successful lobbying forces in Juneau aided by their 
legislators. The state-local IGR relationship is cov-
ered extensively in Chapter 18.
Local Government Relations with  
Other Local Governments 
Local governments interact in several ways that, 
for the most part, involve cooperation. Cities within 
a borough, such as Homer and Seward within the 
Kenai Peninsula Borough, work together to share 
some services and to prevent duplication and 
unnecessary costs. Adjacent local governments, 
like the cities of Fairbanks and North Pole within 
the Fairbanks North Star Borough, also often work 
together for similar reasons. Local governments 
interact in a major way through their state orga-
nization, the Alaska Municipal League (AML). This 
interaction occurs through AML’s annual confer-
ence and other AML programs throughout the year. 
AML also lobbies on behalf of local government on 
general issues. 
Sometimes, however, local governments differ 
over issues. This often occurs at AML meetings over 
policies that benefit some local governments and 
not others, as in the case of school funding. Also, 
local governments sometimes conflict over territo-
rial jurisdiction issues. This occurred, for instance, 
between the Juneau and proposed Petersburg bor-
oughs in 2011 and 2012 regarding annexing land in 
the Unorganized Borough (the part of the state with 
no organized local government).  
FEDERAL, STATE, LOCAL IGR WITH  
ALASKA NATIVE GOVERNMENTS AND  
QUASI-GOVERNMENTS
This aspect of IGR is covered in Chapter 9 on 
Alaska Natives. In outline the main characteristics 
are as follows.  
Federal-Native Government Relations
The federal government’s responsibility for 
dealing with Indian tribes means that its role is 
the major aspect of IGR involving Alaska’s Native 
communities. Although the reservation system is 
minimal in Alaska and the federal government has 
attempted to reduce its role with Alaska Natives 
since the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act 
(ANCSA) of 1971, the federal government still pro-
vides major funding for many Alaska Native pro-
grams, including the Indian Health Service. And 
various Native organizations from the Alaska Fed-
eration of Natives (AFN) to regional and village cor-
porations lobby the federal government in Alaska 
and in Washington, D.C.   
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Although the state has never recognized Native 
sovereignty, it has long worked with Native tribal 
governments to help fund services, especially 
where there is no state local government unit. The 
Alaska Court System and the Department of Public 
Safety, for instance, have long histories of coop-
erating with Native governments on legal and law 
enforcement jurisdictional issues.  
Local Government-Native Government IGR
Tribal governments, Native village corporations, 
and Native regional nonprofit organizations, often 
overlap geographically with cities incorporated 
under state law. This is the case, for example, in 
Bethel in Southwest Alaska and Barrow on the 
North Slope. For efficiency purposes this neces-
sitates cooperation between Native organizations 
and local government units, and such cooperation 
is common.   
STATE IGR WITH OTHER STATES AND  
GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS
Alaska State Government Relations with  
Individual States
Alaska’s one-on-one IGR with individual states 
can occur through the auspices of the federal gov-
ernment or directly. An example of the former is 
through the North Pacific Fishery Management 
Council (NPFMC) in dealing with Oregon and Wash-
ington State. NPFMC is the federal advisory panel 
that manages fisheries in the federal Exclusive 
Economic Zone (EEZ) from three to two hundred 
miles offshore, whose membership also includes 
these other two northwestern states. Examples of 
the second type of interaction include the return of 
fugitives and arrangements for exempting another 
state’s residents from state sales tax, such as 
Washington State allows for Alaskans. 
Alaska’s Membership in State Compacts 
These are agreements between the states to 
facilitate cooperation in areas of policy implemen-
tation and other activities that are advantageous to 
the member states. 
Alaska belongs to several compacts. At the 
national level these include the Driver License 
Compact, the Interstate Civil Defense and Disaster 
Compact, and the Multistate Tax Compact. Region-
ally, Alaska is also a member of several compacts, 
including the Western Interstate Corrections Com-
pact, the Western Interstate Nuclear Compact, and 
the Western Regional Higher Education Compact.  
Membership in National and Regional 
 Governmental Organizations
Like all states, Alaska, its three branches of 
government, and various state officials are mem-
bers of a range of organizations that facilitate the 
exchange of ideas and often act as an advocacy 
group with the federal government and sometimes 
with foreign governments. These organizations 
include the Council of State Governments (CSG) 
and its regional office, the Western Council of State 
Governments, the National and Western Governors 
Associations (NGA and WGA), the National Con-
ference of State Legislatures (NCSL), the National 
Center for State Courts (NCSC), and the National 
Association of State Budget Officers (NASBO). 
Source: Developed by the authors.   
Alaska’s informal interactions with foreign governments are also part of the polit-
ical aspects of IGR, as is the case in all states. This aspect of Alaska’s IGR, however, is 
not included in Figure 10.1 and Box 10.1 because states cannot have formal diplomatic 
relations with foreign government such as Canada or Japan. However, the wide-ranging 
aspects of Alaska’s informal interactions with foreign governments both under federal 
auspices and on its own are considered in Chapter 11 on Alaska and the world. 
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4. THE EVOLUTION OF THE STRUCTURE AND POLITICS OF ALASKA’S IGR  
Even though the United States purchased Alaska from Russia in 1867, Alaska’s IGR 
did not begin in a practical way until the creation of the Territory of Alaska in 1912. This 
is because from 1867 to 1912 there was no government for the vast region as a whole. 
Although there were local governments during this period, Alaska was run by various 
agencies of the federal government. Territorial status brought a Territorial legislature and 
a nonvoting member of Congress. It also established rules for local government, most 
notably the prohibition against the establishment of counties. This was the result of the 
influence of powerful economic interests, especially the fishing and mining companies, 
who feared the imposition of taxes and other interference by county governments. 
the territorial period—1912–1959 
The federal government was dominant in the IGR relationship during the Territorial 
period. Dominance was assured by the U.S. president’s authority to appoint the governor 
of the Territory, by the authority of Congress to veto acts of the Territorial legislature, 
and by the absence of a Territorial judiciary—all courts were federal courts. The fishing 
and mining industries with major operations in Alaska exerted considerable influence 
in Congress and worked to prevent the Territorial legislature from having control over 
the management of fish and game and the management and settlement of Alaska lands.9 
The federal government did contribute to the Territory’s development, such as by con-
structing the Alaska Railroad between 1914 and 1923. However, the Territorial period 
was marked by a feeling of colonial status on the part of many Alaskans. This feeling 
ultimately led to the move for statehood.  
During the Territorial years, two acts of Congress were particularly important in 
shaping Territorial-federal relations. Both continue to have important effects on IGR 
today. One was the Jones Act (formally the Merchant Marine Act) of 1920, which requires 
that goods shipped between U.S. ports must be transported in U.S.-built vessels with U.S. 
crews. The higher cost of building a vessel in the United States and the higher wage rates 
for U.S. crews compared with many other countries increases the cost of transporting 
goods to and from Alaska. The other act was the Indian Reorganization Act (IRA) of 1934, 
with particular Alaska provisions added in 1936, which established rules for recognizing 
tribes, strengthening tribal government, aiding tribal business activities, Native control 
over lands, and eligibility to receive federal aid.10 
The expansion of the population as a result of Alaska’s strategic importance in World 
War II fueled the statehood movement. Many Alaskans were frustrated by the constraints 
on their self-government, their lack of control of Alaska’s land and its resources and their 
inability to combat the powerful Outside interests, primarily those of fishing and mining, 
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which had a huge influence on Alaska’s political and economic life at the time. The suc-
cessful drive for statehood, incorporated in the Alaska Statehood Act signed by President 
Eisenhower in July 1958, changed Alaska’s IGR power relationship with the federal gov-
ernment in Alaska’s favor in many ways. The new Alaska Constitution, which played a 
large part in securing statehood, set the pattern for the state-local IGR relationship.
the First twenty-Five Years of Statehood
In the formative years of statehood, from 1959 to the mid-1980s, Alaska’s IGR devel-
oped particular administrative and political characteristics. Together with the Statehood 
Act, the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (ANCSA) of 1971 (and its subsequent 
amendments), and the Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act (ANILCA) of 
1980, were landmark events. The latter two marked a major change in federal-state rela-
tions in Alaska. 
The provisions of ANCSA established for-profit regional corporations and village 
corporations and helped solidify the regional nonprofit associations, many of which had 
existed in some form before 1971. ANCSA was particularly instrumental in influenc-
ing Alaska’s present dual IGR system involving Native governments.11 ANILCA, which 
placed more than one hundred million acres of federal lands into national forests, parks, 
and wildlife refuges, was the manifestation in Alaska of a broader change in federal-state 
relations. This change was particularly evident in the western states and reflected a power 
shift in Washington, D.C., with the rise of the environmental movement. As John Katz, 
for many years the head of the Alaska governor’s office in Washington, D.C., comments 
in Chapter 2, western lands were no longer to be used for economic development alone.12 
There was a strong reaction to this changing use of lands in the West, including in Alaska.13
The negotiations on ANILCA and its eventual passage and other actions, such as the 
U.S. Supreme Court striking down an early version of the Permanent Fund Dividend 
(PFD) program that gave more money to longer-term residents, together with a general 
antipathy to federal authority among many Alaskans and politicians, fueled anti-federal 
sentiment in these years. The state government tried unsuccessfully to block federal leg-
islation to place over a quarter of Alaska’s land area off-limits to development. These 
provisions, found in section 17(d)(2) of ANCSA (often referred to as “d2 lands”), were 
implemented through ANILCA. An extreme—political fringe—response to these var-
ious federal actions, but nevertheless representing a highly publicized manifestation of 
this federal antipathy, was from the Alaska Independence Party (AIP). The AIP had most 
of its support in Interior Alaska and at various times advocated Alaskan independence 
from the United States. 
Two mainstream political expressions of concern among Alaskans about federal 
authority occurred in 1980 and 1982. In 1980 the voters narrowly passed, by 51 to 49 
326
ALASKA POLITICS AND PUBLIC POLICY
percent, a ballot measure (in this case, an advisory vote) asking the legislature to set up a 
statehood commission to reconsider Alaska’s relationship with the federal government.14 
Then in 1982 the so-called Tundra Rebellion initiative appeared on the ballot. This was 
Alaska’s version of the Sagebrush Rebellion that was sweeping the American West in 
these years. Alaska’s initiative, which passed overwhelmingly by 73 to 27 percent, claimed 
much of the federal land remaining in the state for Alaska.15 The statehood commission 
met and produced a report, but nothing came of it because, like the Tundra Rebellion 
initiative, it ran afoul of the U.S. Constitution and federal laws.16 These actions, as with 
many before and since, were symbolic expressions of the frustration of many Alaskans 
with federal actions. The federal government largely ignored them, and their effect on 
federal actions was close to zero. 
While many Alaskans and several of their politicians, including members of the 
state’s congressional delegation and Joe Vogler, the leader of the AIP, were soldiers in the 
battle against the federal government, none was more vocal, tenacious, and combative 
than Walter J. (Wally) Hickel. He took on this role despite, or perhaps because of, being 
appointed Secretary of the Interior by Richard Nixon from 1969 until Hickel’s resigna-
tion in November 1970. From his first term as governor (1966–1969) when he unsuc-
cessfully fought the federal government to get an exemption from the Jones Act for the 
Wickersham, a foreign-built ferry bought by the Alaska Ferry System, to his fight against 
the federally-mandated rural preference for subsistence hunting and fishing in his second 
term (1990–1994), he was a gladiator. It was a David in a battle with Goliath. He nonethe-
less fought to secure what he considered to be the federal promise to Alaska at statehood.17 
In this case, however, Goliath won. 
Hickel’s deep belief in federal injustice toward Alaska led him to help establish both 
Commonwealth North and the Institute of the North, organizations to explore and pro-
mote Alaska solutions to problems and his idea of Alaska as an Owner State with its own-
ership of vast land and resources. In 1990 Commonwealth North published a book with 
the unambiguous title Going Up in Flames: The Promises and Pledges of Alaska Statehood 
Under Attack.18 Even as late as 2009, within a year of his death in May 2010, Hickel 
contributed a piece to the Anchorage Daily News headlined, “Feds have Abused Their 
Compact with Alaska.”19 Even though he used the AIP party label to get elected to a sec-
ond term as governor in 1990 (after he was defeated in the Republican primary),,Hickel 
never pursued independence. Clearly, he wanted to work out an Alaska solution with the 
state remaining part of the United States. 
Meanwhile, over the twenty-five years following statehood federal funds continued 
to flow into the state in various forms and in increasing amounts, in large part because of 
the increasing influence of Alaska’s senior U.S. senator, Ted Stevens. And the twenty-fifth 
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anniversary of statehood in 1984 was marked by negotiations to transfer the Alaska 
Railroad from federal to state ownership. The transfer occurred the following year. 
From the Mid-1980s to 2015
The period since the twenty-fifth anniversary of statehood has been marked by three 
major issue areas in federal-state IGR: the legal and political aspects of federal monies 
coming to Alaska and the two often related issue areas of federal regulations and land and 
natural resources management. These issue areas have involved both cooperation and 
conflict, and most of the specific issues within these areas can be traced to the formative 
developments in IGR following statehood.
Federal monies coming to Alaska are of various types, including direct payments to 
individuals in the form of salaries to federal employees and programs like Social Security, 
payments that go through the state for programs like Medicaid and a host of other services, 
direct payments to local governments, and funding and payments to Native corporations 
and other organizations. Whether one type of federal payment is considered by itself or 
whether total federal funds coming to the state overall are included, Alaska has ranked in 
the top five, and often as number one, from statehood to the present, among the fifty states 
in the amount of federal funds received on a per capita basis. Together with oil, the federal 
government is one of two major economic drivers of the Alaska economy. To put no finer 
point on it, Alaska is more dependent on federal funds than the vast majority of states, and 
it would be a much different place without these funds.20 Even a small reduction can have 
serious effects on the state’s economy. In fact, given the major expansion in programs of all 
types and the increase in federal funds to help finance them, Alaska was more dependent 
on federal funds in 2016 than it was at the time of statehood in 1959.
In regard to state-federal relations on particular policies and their administration, 
as with the majority of aspects of IGR, there has been extensive cooperation, though 
the state and federal government working in harmony gets little publicity. In part, this 
state-federal cooperation occurs because many programs, like Medicaid, those for dis-
advantaged children, as well as many transportation projects, require a state match of 
federal funds, and the state willingly goes along to receive the major federal contributions. 
Plus, the federal government protects Alaska’s interests in fishing disputes with Canada 
and Japan and works with it on Arctic issues. 
Some issues, however, particularly those regarding developers versus environmental-
ists (land use, oil and gas and mining development, air quality, protection of endangered 
species, among others) and involving Alaska Natives (especially subsistence), have been 
high-profile conflicts. The state won a major victory in the federal courts in the Venetie 
case, which denied the existence of “Indian Country” for most of Alaska and which was 
not received positively by many segments of the Native population. Perhaps the two 
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major issues in recent years that produced the most antagonism between many Alaskans 
and the federal government have been failure to open ANWR to oil and gas exploration 
and failure to resolve the subsistence issue.21   
Other Developments in IGr since Statehood
Since statehood, there have been other developments in Alaska’s IGR besides that 
with the federal government. Three are particularly noteworthy. 
State-local relations have been affected by the slow development of the local govern-
ment system as envisaged by Alaska’s founders (see Chapter 18) and by the oil bonanza. 
Much of the state is still not organized into local governments, and the state has pro-
vided much of the funding for many local governments, though this funding has been 
considerably reduced since the crash in oil prices in 1986. The second is state relations 
with other states through the development of one-on-one relationships and state com-
pacts and cooperation with other states through federal auspices like the North Pacific 
Fisheries Management Council. The third development is state-Native government and 
local government–Native government relations. Besides the Venetie case, these relations 
have primarily been shaped by ANCSA, the battle over subsistence, and the changing 
influence of Native politicians that reached its high point in the 1980s and early 1990s.
5. PERSPECTIVES ON THE ALASKA-FEDERAL RELATIONSHIP
While much media coverage of the Alaska federal-state relationship is balanced, and 
not all politicians vocalize anti-federal sentiments, over the years there has been more 
emphasis on what we might call the Hickel anti-federal sentiment than on the benefits the 
federal government provides to Alaska. As former Governor Knowles aptly put it regard-
ing Alaska politicians: “You’ll never lose a vote by beating up on the feds.”22 In this section 
we offer three perspectives on the Alaska-federal relationship. The first is from Alaskans; 
the second comes from Washington, D.C., and the rest of the nation; and the third is a 
realistic and practical perspective. 
alaska perspectives
Some Alaskans very likely understand little or simply do not care about the role of the 
federal government in their state. This is probably because the federal government does 
not appear to affect them directly or because they avoid politics and those involved in it. Of 
those Alaskans and their politicians who are concerned or closely affected by state-federal 
IGR, the views run the gamut from the former AIP position of seeking Alaska indepen-
dence to those who see a very positive and indispensable role for Washington, D.C. These 
attitudes result from a complex set of factors, including ideology and political culture, 
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perceived economic and political gains and losses, particular events, and, in the case of 
state executive officials, current administration policy. Here we identify five perspectives, 
but emphasize that they are not mutually exclusive. Different organizations, groups, con-
stituencies, and individuals may, at various times, express one or more perspectives. 
First, there are some Alaskans who believe they have suffered from past federal pol-
icies and some who see federal actions as detrimental to them today. The point is not 
whether their concerns are justified. What is important is that they believe them to be 
so. It is not difficult to show that federal actions have been detrimental to them, at least 
in some way. These groups may not be totally anti-federal, but simply have what they 
see as legitimate concerns—concerns that are not so different from those that fueled the 
drive for statehood. More specifically, for many years and in some quarters today, Alaska 
Natives have seen themselves suffering at federal hands. For instance, Julie Kitka, presi-
dent of the Alaska Federation of Natives at various times, characterized the historical role 
of the federal government as a “take it or leave it type approach or it has been that the 
federal policy makers make the decisions and the communities are just the recipients.”23 
Another group with such concerns is made up of those who want to develop the state, 
such as the late Governor Hickel, but are constrained by the federal government and who 
believe they may have fewer employment and other economic opportunities because of it.
Some of this feeling likely comes from the nature of the three broad types of pub-
lic policies that the federal government develops and administers. These are explained 
in Chapter 3 as distributive, redistributive, and regulatory policies. Distributive policies, 
many of which are entitlement programs, such as Social Security and Medicare, raise 
little ire and are generally favorably viewed by Alaskans. Not so with the other two types 
of policies. Redistributive policies, like those related to giving rural residents (in reality 
Native Alaskans) priority over fish and game in times of shortage, irk many Alaskans, as 
do the many regulatory policies regarding the use of land and environmental protection. 
The second perspective is shown by actions taken by the State of Alaska, as represented 
by the governor and his or her administration. One role that Alaska governors have taken 
on is that of “Defender of Alaska” against hostile Outside interests, and the federal govern-
ment is often seen as being one of them. Consequently, over the years the state has taken 
the federal government to task, and sometimes even to court, on a range of issues, includ-
ing the opening of ANWR, the Endangered Species Act, subsistence hunting and fishing, 
and jurisdiction over Little Diomede Island in the Bering Strait. Sometimes state actions 
are driven by technical and nonpartisan concerns, as with state Senator Bill Wielechowski’s 
“Real ID” bill to prevent implementation of a federal I.D. system in Alaska (see Chapter 3, 
Box 3.5). At other times partisanship and ideology appear to be the primary motivators, 
as in Governor Palin’s rejection of federal stimulus funds in 2009 and Governor Parnell’s 
opposition to the Obama health care plan following its enactment in 2010.  
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The third perspective relates to an aspect of Alaska’s political culture that is com-
mon among many Alaskans—an attitude toward Washington, D.C., that ranges from 
skepticism to negativism to downright hostility. In recent years “federal overreach” has 
become a catchphrase for those sharing this perspective. Sometimes this perspective has 
a rational basis, such as genuine disagreement with the federal government over a par-
ticular animal being placed on the endangered species list or restrictions on logging in 
the Tongass National Forest. But the claim of federal overreach can also be riddled with 
contradictions and emotions. Many Alaskans who share this perspective, and often the 
most vocal among them, have limited or selective knowledge on the issue at hand or are 
simply misinformed about the role of the federal government as it relates to the issue. The 
past AIP platform urging Alaska to secede from the Union is an extreme example.
A fourth perspective is that of Alaska’s politicians. Since politicians often reflect the 
views of their constituents, it is not surprising that many politicians also have, or at least 
express, a negative attitude toward the federal government. Even though these politicians 
may realize the value of the federal government, they see political hay to be made out of 
federal bashing. Over the years, federal bashing has come from a wide range of politicians 
from both political parties, including the state’s congressional delegation as well as gover-
nors, state legislators, and local government officials. The contradiction in this anti-federal 
attitude among both the public and their politicians is epitomized in the headline of an 
opinion piece by Julia O’Malley in the Anchorage Daily News: “Feds we loath you, please 
send money.”24 This sentiment, described in Chapter 2 as the western political paradox, is a 
common feature of attitudes in the American West, particularly in the Mountain states. In 
Alaska, at least, this attitude is not confined to the federal government. It is part of Alaska’s 
populist side and extends to just about any Outside group—the Seattle fishing industry, big 
oil, national environmental groups, among other forces. Whether in fact or fiction, these 
groups are seen as having an undue influence on Alaska’s affairs and as holding a different 
set of values from the people who live in “the great land.”25 
The fifth perspective is that of those who see the value of federal action in Alaska 
because they personally benefit economically or politically, or they see the broader bene-
fits to Alaska and its citizens. Those who hold this perspective overall may also, on occa-
sion, take action because of what they see as intrusive or uninformed federal policies or 
for other reasons, such as the case of Senator Wielechowski and his legislation barring the 
expenditure of state funds to implement the federal Real ID law, even though his actions 
generally have indicated that he sees the value of the federal government. Those who hold 
this generally positive perspective range from federal employees to many segments of the 
Native community to those who want to put some controls on development in the state, 
particularly the Alaska environmental community. The strength of environmentalists in 
Alaska comes largely from federal laws and actions and from public support in the rest 
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of the nation and around the world, though there are certainly active, if relatively small, 
environmental groups within Alaska. 
the perspective from Washington, D.C., and the Nation
As in the case of Alaska’s view of the federal government, there is no one perspective 
on Alaska from Washington, D.C., or among the states, organizations, and constituencies 
in the rest of the nation. These perspectives are diverse and vary from time to time on par-
ticular issues and in response to the positions taken by Alaska’s state government and its 
political constituencies. Nevertheless, there are several reasons why Alaska’s perspectives 
on issues and policies often meet with resistance from Outside forces. 
First, the federal government, its branches, and myriad agencies, is the government for 
the entire nation and its territories. The national government has an obligation to uphold 
the U.S. Constitution and federal laws and to enforce those laws. Consequently, theoreti-
cally and in practice, it has to take a broad view in policy making and not just champion 
the cause of one state. This broad view produces potential clashes with the states. For exam-
ple, possession and sale of marijuana is illegal under federal law, yet as of 2015 Colorado, 
Washington State, Oregon and Alaska have state laws making possession and sale legal in 
their states. At the same time, for a host of programs, from Medicaid to road construc-
tion, the federal government allows the states, including Alaska, the flexibility to fine tune 
the way they deliver these programs. It is certainly true that the federal government has 
made mistakes in applying laws and regulations to Alaska and that there will always be 
insensitive and inflexible federal government officials. However, the charge that the federal 
government “does not understand Alaska” and that the state is a “victim” of federal short-
comings, is much less accurate than many anti-federal elements in Alaska might believe.
A second Outside perspective, often at odds with prevalent Alaska perspectives, has 
to do with the view that surrounds Alaska in the minds of many Americans—that of the 
Last Frontier. From this perspective, Alaska is a special, even somewhat exotic and mys-
tical, place that many would like to visit some day. Much of this mystique results from 
an idealized view of Alaska, but nevertheless it often translates into federal policies that 
many Alaskans find objectionable, in part because they simply disagree with them and in 
part because they undermine Alaskans’ control over their own state. These external atti-
tudes tend to favor the preservation of the state’s natural resources, such as the outcry over 
the systematic killing of wolves during 1993–1994 under the second Hickel administra-
tion, and the long and unsuccessful fight to open ANWR. However, as a major landholder 
and with control over most of the oceans surrounding the state and with national policies 
to protect endangered species, the federal government is asserting its rights as reflected 
in American public opinion expressed through Congress and federal laws. In the end, it 
all boils down to politics and power. 
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Politics and power are at the root of the third Outside perspective relating to the 
Alaska-federal relationship and federal-state IGR. Federal-state relations across the nation 
are not static but constantly evolve and will continue to do so. This is largely because of 
public pressures and needs that are spearheaded by the President and Congress and usu-
ally affirmed by the federal courts. In particular, from the late 1960s onward, changes 
in the federal-state relationship were the case with the rise of federal policies regard-
ing environmental conservation and protection, which has particularly affected Alaska. 
Consequently, from both a legal and a political perspective, there is no way that the federal 
government can be held to fulfill what many, including the late Governor Hickel, see as 
“the promise of Alaska statehood” dating back to 1959. The national government—much 
like Alaska—was itself on the receiving end of inexorable forces at that time, which swept 
across the nation as America developed into a post-industrial society and became con-
cerned about not just economic benefits, but also quality of life issues and other values. 
So, in effect, those like Hickel who see the federal government as betraying the promise 
of statehood (though exactly what that promise was is subject to dispute) are caught in a 
time warp—politically frozen in a bygone age of Alaska-federal relations.  
The fourth and fifth Outside perspectives are closely related: those of Alaska’s finan-
cial relationship with Washington, D.C., and how this influences the perceptions about 
Alaska among some politicians, journalists, and groups and individuals in the rest of the 
nation. The fourth perspective, which is a clearly demonstrable fact, is that Alaska, its cit-
izens, and their lifestyle are heavily subsidized by the rest of the nation. Journalist Charles 
Homans sums up this reality well in the title of a 2007 article, “State of Dependence: Ted 
Stevens’s Alaska Problem—and Ours,” and in his observation that, “Simply put, Alaska 
has made a habit of transferring its operating costs to the federal government . . . . a 
drain that looks especially bad in light of the state’s fiscal reality.”26 The gist of Homans’s 
article is that, in large part, the political skill of Senator Stevens got Alaska much more 
than its fair share of federal monies. These funds have not come out of thin air, but indi-
rectly from other states whose citizens pay more into the federal treasury than they get 
back. Certainly, many less well-off states, like Mississippi and Louisiana, receive more 
federal funds than they pay to Washington, D.C. But Alaska is not a poor state, with its 
$52 billion Permanent Fund and, as of 2015, no state individual income tax and no state-
wide sales tax. Put bluntly, this means that until Senator Stevens’s defeat in 2008, Alaska’s 
advantageous political position in Congress enabled it to use other states’ money while 
Alaskans were unwilling to dip into their own pockets and reserves to help themselves. 
The fifth perspective—one of annoyance and resentment toward Alaska by many in 
Congress and of ridicule in the media—is a direct result of the huge amounts of earmarked 
federal funds that came Alaska’s way, largely through Senator Stevens’s efforts. Given the 
reality of Alaska’s dependence and political influence, this perspective is understandable. 
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And it is not surprising that moves were successful in ending congressional earmarks, at 
which Senator Stevens was a master. Nor is it surprising that there are sometimes articles 
in the national press mocking Alaska’s annual payout of the PFD, the so-called “Bridge to 
Nowhere” (linking Ketchikan with its island airport and which in 2008 became the media 
poster child for the evils of congressional earmarks), and derision of earlier calls by the 
AIP for Alaskan independence. Concerned about Alaska’s image in the rest of the nation, 
then Governor Frank Murkowski suggested hiring a public relations firm to counter the 
image that Alaska has acquired as a freeloaders’ paradise.27  
a holistic, practical, Give-and-take perspective
The Alaskan, the federal, and the national public’s views on Alaska-federal relations 
all have their merits, and the actions based upon them may have some influence on the 
relationship as it operates day-to-day. But at its core, the relationship is shaped by political 
power. As a result of the federal government’s constitutional and statutory authority, its 
tremendous financial resources, and Alaska’s dependence on federal funds, the federal 
government has the upper hand in its relations with Alaska. So, Alaska’s success in deal-
ing with the federal government depends on recognizing this superior position, on the 
skill of Alaskan politicians working in Washington, D.C., and on the ongoing give and 
take in the relationship. 
Box 10.2 provides a holistic, give-and-take perspective on Alaska’s relationship with 
the federal government by former Governor Tony Knowles. Four additional points help 
to supplement this perspective. First, as mentioned before, the federal government is not 
a monolith and should not be considered as such. Second, as with all states, major fund-
ing for programs such as Medicaid, transportation facilities, and some aspects of child 
welfare and education, come from the federal government, and the states must comply 
with federal rules and often match federal funds to receive these needed revenues. 
Third, despite the restrictions on these and other monies, the federal government 
has long taken into consideration variations in state populations, geography, levels of 
economic well-being, and so on in allocating funds, and it often allows for state input 
and variations in programs. Washington, D.C., has become more “state friendly” in this 
regard as the result of political pressures since the 1960s. Alaska has benefited consider-
ably from such federal formulas and variations. 
Fourth, much of the negative attitude Alaskans have toward the federal government 
stems from frustration at Alaska’s inability to control its own affairs. This frustration 
was the major push behind statehood in the 1950s and continues to be prevalent today. 
Ironically, however, Alaska’s major dependence on federal funds undermines that inde-
pendence. But, as Charles Homans points out, this is actually a dependence of choice, the 
choice to seek major federal funds and thus be bound by federal rules.28 Furthermore, 
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sometimes ideology as opposed to economics or pragmatism undermines Alaska’s con-
trol of its own affairs. As Governor Knowles points out in Box 10.2, this occurred over 
failure to deal with the subsistence issue. Another example is Governor Parnell’s July 2012 
decision not to set up a health care insurance exchange under the Affordable Care Act 
(commonly known as Obamacare) for those who need to buy health insurance, but to let 
the federal government run it instead.
6. THE POLITICS OF CONTEMPORARY FEDERAL RELATIONS  
    WITH ALASKA GOVERNMENTS 
While the legal context of Alaska-federal IGR is set by the U.S. Constitution, vari-
ous legal and regulatory provisions, and their interpretation by the federal courts, the 
relationship on a day-to-day basis is determined by administrative relationships, politics, 
and power. Here we briefly examine this practical operation of Alaska-federal IGR, par-
ticularly the role of federal and state bureaucrats, the governor, the governor’s office in 
Washington, D.C., and Alaska’s congressional delegation.
By far the major aspect of Alaska-federal IGR is low-key, behind-the-scenes inter-
actions between federal, state, and local government officials dealing with the myriad 
of policies and procedures that involve cooperation between the national and Alaska 
governments. This involves many diverse activities, including the transfer of funds for 
programs like Denali KidCare and contact between officials from the federal and state 
departments of transportation on various projects for roads, the Alaska Railroad, air-
ports, and harbors. It also involves various federal agencies, such as the Bureau of Indian 
Affairs and the Indian Health Service, dealing with Native governments and Native cor-
porations. Occasionally, high-level federal officials, such as the secretaries and deputy 
secretaries of departments like Interior and Homeland Security, visit Alaska to meet with 
state and local officials and with various Alaska constituencies on issues ranging from 
improving security at Alaska airports to oil drilling on federal land and in the Arctic. 
There is no single attitude toward the federal government in Alaska and no broad 
agreement among its citizens or its politicians on what policies to pursue in Washington, 
D.C. However, at any one time, Alaska’s governor pursues a more or less defined set of 
policies in close cooperation with the three members of Alaska’s congressional delegation. 
Besides being in regular contact with the three members of the delegation, the governor 
is kept informed about federal issues by the state’s Washington, D.C., office. This office 
acts as a coordinating body for Alaska state government, such as facilitating visits by state 
legislators and commissioners and as an information resource. John Katz, who headed 
this office for thirty years and served seven governors, explains the role of the office and 
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 BOX 10.2 
alaska and the Federal Government— 
past, present, and Future: a perspective by  
Former Governor tony Knowles
The legacy of the heavy-handed federal actions 
of territorial days, buoyed by the more recent con-
troversial decisions such as d2 lands withdrawals 
under ANILCA, ANWR’s lack of development, and 
Tongass Forest management, continue to make the 
federal government an Alaska punching bag. As 
a result, many Alaskans relate to the anti-federal 
rhetoric of some state politicians, including Alas-
ka’s congressional delegation. And every governor, 
regardless of party affiliation, has taken the federal 
government to court, challenging both the adminis-
tration of various laws and their substance.
Yet, history provides a different perspective. 
Rather than an extractive and dictatorial absentee 
landlord, as viewed by conventional wisdom, over 
the years congressional and presidential actions 
can be viewed as responsive to Alaska’s and Amer-
ica’s needs. In the Alaska Statehood Act, Congress 
addressed future jobs and economic development 
for a state that had no economic base by provid-
ing 103 million acres of land of the state’s choosing. 
The state guaranteed its fiscal future by choosing, 
among other lands, the acreage on the Arctic North 
Slope that included the future Prudhoe Bay oil and 
gas discovery, the largest in American history. 
Then, both ANCSA of 1971 and ANILCA of 1980 
can be considered major benefits to Alaska and its 
people. In ANCSA, after two hundred years of bro-
ken promises and failed programs for its indigenous 
peoples, Congress took a new course in addressing 
social justice. Then ANILCA set the scene for con-
serving Alaska’s natural beauty and environment. 
One provision in ANILCA, Title 8, guaranteed 
an essential part of Alaska Native interests not 
included in the ANCSA bill. This grants a prefer-
ence for subsistence hunting and fishing for “rural 
residents.” As long as the state enforced this pref-
erence, Title 8 retained state management of all 
fish and game regulations on federal and state 
lands as well as private lands. Unwillingness by the 
state to provide for this preference would turn fish 
and game management on federal land over to the 
federal government. By making the differentiation 
a geographical preference rather than a racial pref-
erence, ANILCA avoided imposing different rules for 
different families in a village, thereby pitting neigh-
bor against neighbor. 
Yet, intense legal and political controversy 
ensued. A group of hunting advocates from the 
Alaska Outdoor Council led the fight against any 
preference for access to hunting and fishing. Their 
cause was bolstered by two developments. The first 
was an Alaska Supreme Court ruling declaring 
unconstitutional the state’s attempt to comply with 
ANILCA’s rural preference requirement because it 
failed to provide equal access to state resources 
as required by the Alaska Constitution. The second 
was the Hickel administration’s challenge to the 
authority of the federal government to implement 
such a rural preference. 
It was my contention that there was no legal 
argument that prohibited the U.S. Secretary of the 
Interior from drawing up regulations implement-
ing a national law. So when I took office in 1994 I 
dropped the lawsuit that the Hickel administration 
had begun. I realized that the only way out of the 
situation was to amend the Alaska Constitution to 
bring it in line with the federal preference require-
ment. However, despite overwhelming public sup-
port by all polls conducted and strong Alaska Native 
organizational support, the issue has been narrowly 
defeated in the legislature on several occasions and 
has not appeared on the ballot. The consequence 
was that the state lost the right to manage wildlife 
on federal lands, including subsistence.  
Today, besides the ongoing issue of subsis-
tence there are several other important issues that 
require good relations between the state and federal 
governments. While these issues are national in 
scope, some have a particular Alaska element. The 
military is particularly important to Alaska, and the 
state’s geographical advantage for global deploy-
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ment of rapid response military forces insures a 
continued strong military presence in Alaska. As 
the state with the largest per capita number of vet-
erans, health care for veterans is of special signif-
icance to an aging Vietnam-era veteran population 
as well as the surge of new veterans from the Iraq 
and Afghanistan wars needing health care support. 
More broadly, health care through the Indian Health 
Service, Medicare to a rapidly aging population, and 
the national obligation to the uninsured and under-
insured require a state-federal partnership that is 
essential to a many Alaskans.
The consequences of global climate change 
affect Alaska, America’s only Arctic state, to a far 
greater degree than any other state. The repercus-
sions to the environment, wildlife, fisheries, subsis-
tence foods, and coastal development require close, 
cooperative relations between state and federal 
agencies for coping with and mitigating climate 
change.
Looking at the big picture of the state-federal 
relationship, there has to be give and take in a fed-
eral system like ours. There is a stark inconsis-
tency between taking major federal benefits and 
not wanting federal restrictions. An anti-federal 
attitude taken too far can be disadvantageous to 
the state and even undermine its long-cherished 
desires. For instance, having subsistence under 
the co-management of federal and state systems 
is not in the best interest of the resource or the 
people affected. Ironically, it means that a major 
goal behind statehood, for Alaska to exert more 
control over its own resources, has been partly 
relinquished because of the inability of Alaskans to 
come to a political solution to this problem. There 
continues to be an overwhelming effect on Alaska’s 
future because of federal management decisions 
on federal lands and waters. The careful protection 
and utilization of these resources require a collab-
orative approach by state and federal governments.
Good science, sound management, and a coop-
erative relationship are the hallmarks of a fed-
eral-state relationship that may be bad political 
theater but provide good government. So however 
convenient and politically advantageous scape-
goating and federal bashing may be, the relation-
ship with the federal government will be far more 
successful for Alaska with engagement rather than 
estrangement. 
Source: Developed by Clive Thomas and Anthony Nakazawa; based on an interview with former Governor 
Tony Knowles, March 8, 2009.    
assesses its successes and disappointments in Box 10.3. Since Katz’s retirement in 2013, 
however, the office has undergone major changes. The ban on congressional earmarks in 
2011 reduced the office’s workload as, until then, much time was spent on providing sup-
port for Alaska’s congressional delegation to secure these special appropriations. Then, as 
a result of the downturn in oil prices in 2014 and beyond, in 2015 the office was reduced 
from five to two staff and the director’s job went unfilled. This, according to Governor 
Walker, would save the state about $400,000 a year.29 In both the short and long term, 
however, this reduction in staffing could hurt Alaska given its major dependence on fed-
eral funds.
Much of the success of the governor’s policy goals, both high and low profile, in 
relation to the federal government depends on Alaska’s congressional delegation. With 
only three members of Congress (out of 535—100 in the Senate and 435 in the House of 
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 BOX 10.3 
the Governor’s Washington, D.C., Office:  
Its role, Successes, and Disappointments
Around forty states and U.S. territories have 
offices in Washington, D.C. Their functions differ 
depending upon gubernatorial mandates, issues, 
and budgets. These offices also range in size and 
function. Some engage in significant policy analysis 
and advocacy while others simply exchange infor-
mation between state capitals and D.C. 
Alaska’s office was established by Governor Bill 
Egan in 1972. It usually has a complement of six 
staff members: a director, three associate directors 
who work in specific issue areas, and two support 
staff. When needed, additional technical assistance 
and lobbying are provided by private D.C. firms. The 
principal functions of the office are to: 
• Identify and monitor issues affecting Alaska 
that arise in Congress and federal agencies in 
D.C. 
• Analyze and help formulate state policy on 
these issues
• Advocate policy in various federal forums
The office is also the state’s primary contact with 
the Alaska congressional delegation and works 
closely with the National Governors Association, the 
Western Governors Association, and other organiza-
tions that have an interest in issues affecting Alaska. 
At any one time the office is dealing with more 
than one hundred issues. About 60 percent involve 
legislation in Congress; the rest are matters pend-
ing before federal agencies and administrative tri-
bunals. Considerable time is spent on Alaska-spe-
cific natural resource and environmental matters. 
Other Alaska issues involve health, jobs and fami-
lies, education, transportation, appropriations, and 
international affairs. 
Many state-federal concerns can be resolved 
with the D.C. office playing a minimal role. However, 
when an issue concerns federal legislation, signif-
icant administrative policy, or a matter that cannot 
be settled elsewhere, the D.C. office becomes more 
heavily involved. 
Recent successes in D.C. have included 
• Legislation to facilitate the construction of a 
natural gas pipeline  
• Appropriating funds to address the social, 
health, and economic needs of Alaskans  
• Legislation accelerating the conveyance of 
lands under the Alaska Statehood Act and the 
Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act 
• Reauthorization of the Magnuson-Stevens 
Fishery Conservation and Management Act, 
which governs federal management to the two 
hundred–mile limit 
• Reauthorization of federal surface transporta-
tion legislation that provides funding for high-
ways, ferries, and bridges 
• Federal approval of a military base realign-
ment plan that maintains essential operations 
at Eielson Air Force Base near Fairbanks  
Perhaps Alaska’s biggest disappointment is 
Congress’s continuing unwillingness to approve 
oil development in ANWR. Another problem is the 
inability by Alaska and other western public land 
states to obtain reform of the Endangered Species 
Act including an increased role for states and mak-
ing it easier to de-list a recovered species.
Alaska’s maintenance of a governor’s office in 
D.C. remains important. This is particularly the 
case given the significant presence in and impact 
of the federal government on the state. States 
with no D.C. office cite the reasons of operational 
expense and say that representation is the job 
of their congressional delegations. In fact, the 
expense is minimal considering the more effective 
advocacy that occurs, the successes of most D.C. 
offices, and the savings in travel costs incurred by 
state officials. Further, it is not the role of gover-
nors’ Washington offices to duplicate the functions 
of their congressional delegations. It is to facilitate 
state decision-making on federal issues, explain 
policy positions, and enhance understanding 
between governors and state congressional dele-
gations. 
Source: Developed by John W. Katz, former Director of State-Federal Relations and Special Counsel to 
the Governor. 
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Representatives), on the surface it appears that Alaska has little chance of major successes 
given the need for 218 votes for passage of legislation in the House and 51 in the Senate. 
Success in Washington, D.C., however, depends less on the number of a state’s seats in 
Congress and more on the power of the state’s delegation, which is usually a function of 
what leadership positions, if any, they hold. In this regard, few members of Congress in 
U.S. history equaled the influence of the late Senator Ted Stevens, a Republican. With his 
political skill, ability to work across party lines with Democrats, and the powerful com-
mittees he chaired, Alaska was able to get far more funds per capita than many states with 
much larger congressional delegations. 
Stevens, who served for forty years until his defeat by Democrat Mark Begich in 
2008, was aided for many years by Republican Representative Don Young, who was first 
elected to Congress in 1972, and by Republican Senator Frank Murkowski, who served 
from 1981 to 2002. The seniority of the Alaska delegation enabled them to secure funds 
for Alaska, including five times the average earmarks of the average state. No one more 
than Stevens himself realized that it was long-standing relationships and political power 
that ultimately determined Alaska’s success in IGR with the federal government. 
Since Stevens’s defeat, Alaska’s power in Congress has waned considerably and will 
likely take several years to recover.30 Congressman Young turned eighty-two in 2015, and 
as of 2015 Alaska had one U.S. senator, Lisa Murkowski, in a leadership position, and a 
new face, Dan Sullivan, who triumphed over Mark Begich in November 2014. The wan-
ing of Alaska’s influence is evidenced by the major drop in earmarked funds coming to 
the state in the fiscal year after Stevens’s defeat.31 Some of this decline can be attributed to 
the ban on earmarks adopted following the 2010 elections. Even though there have since 
been several moves to remove the ban on earmarks, the prohibition was still in place in 
late 2015. The ban has taken its toll on Alaska’s share of federal funding.32 A good exam-
ple of an IGR organization that thrived under Stevens’s term in office, but which has suf-
fered major cuts since his departure, is the Denali Commission described in Box 10.4 (on 
page 340). Regardless of party affiliation, Alaska’s congressional delegation has consis-
tently recognized that working across party lines and using a pragmatic, as opposed to an 
ideological approach are the key to Alaska exerting what power it has in dealing with the 
federal government. While Alaska’s three members of Congress were in the Republican 
majority in 2016, if the Democrats win back one or both houses of Congress in 2016, the 
lack of a Democrat in the delegation could hurt Alaska. 
7. ALASKA’S IGR SYSTEM IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE
In comparison to other states, there are both similarities and differences in Alaska’s 
IGR, depending on the level and specifics of the interaction concerned. We look first at 
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the general elements of IGR throughout the fifty states and then those of Alaska’s that 
distinguish it, in varying degrees, from other states.
At the general level, the constitutional, statutory, and political aspects of Alaska’s IGR 
are very similar to those of other states. As in all states, Alaska’s IGR involves interac-
tion between and among the federal government, Alaska state government, and local 
governments. Like the other forty-nine states, Alaska also has relations with other states 
individually, through regional and national compacts, and through organizations such as 
the Council of State Governments and associations for state officials. In addition, whether 
it is Kansas, Maryland, Oregon, Alaska, or any other state, much of the politics of IGR 
concerns money and funding issues, particularly intergovernmental transfers between 
the federal government and state governments, the federal government and local govern-
ments, and the states and their local governments. Moreover, there are constitutional and 
jurisdictional issues that arise among the three levels of government. A recent example 
is over President Obama’s health care legislation of 2010, which many states, including 
Alaska, opposed in part because they saw it as encroaching on their authority. 
On a day-to-day basis, however, it is the fiscal aspects of IGR that determine the 
dynamics of the power relationship between the federal government and the states as 
well as between states and their local governments. In particular, the tremendous finan-
cial resources that the federal government commands give it the upper hand most of the 
time in the IGR power dynamic. Moreover, in Alaska, as in all states, IGR is essentially a 
political power relationship. However, the dynamics of the relationship vary from state 
to state and from time to time, as new developments occur, particularly major federal 
programs such as the New Deal programs of the 1930s, the Great Society programs of 
the 1960s, and the health care legislation of 2010. Overall, virtually all states have become 
increasingly dependent on federal funds as a result of these expanded national programs, 
as Figure 10.2 illustrates.33
Some key contrasts between Alaska’s IGR and other states give a unique character to 
the power dynamics in Alaska’s relations with its local governments and the federal gov-
ernment. The genesis of these contrasts is the confluence of Alaska’s late admission to the 
Union, the state’s oil bonanza, and its physical geography. These elements have worked to 
produce three particular contrasts between Alaska’s IGR and those in other states. One 
is the dual IGR system consisting of the relationships among the federal, state, and local 
governments on the one hand and the relationships of those levels of government with 
various Alaska Native governments and organizations on the other. The second contrast 
stems from Alaska’s geography, which has contributed to the unusual situation that over 
60 percent of Alaska has no organized local government and is theoretically under the 
jurisdiction of the state legislature. The third contrast is that much of the funding of rural-
bush local government (especially for education) and some funding of urban government 
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 BOX 10.4 
the Denali Commission: a New Direction in IGr 
and alaska’s power Decline in Washington, D.C.
Modeled after the Appalachia Regional Com-
mission created in 1966 under the leadership of 
Senator Robert Byrd of West Virginia, the Denali 
Commission is an independent federal agency 
focusing on developing the economy of rural-bush 
Alaska. The commission was created by Congress 
in 1998 largely through the efforts of Alaska’s Sen-
ator Ted Stevens, then chair of the appropriations 
committee.
The goals of the commission are to deliver fed-
eral government services in the most cost-effective 
manner by reducing administrative and overhead 
costs and to provide job training and other eco-
nomic development services in rural-bush areas, 
particularly in distressed communities (many with 
unemployment exceeding 50 percent). However, 
due to its declining budget, the commission’s role 
in promoting rural-bush development has been 
reduced to promoting village-based bulk fuel facil-
ities and supporting village energy conservation 
measures. 
Governed by seven commissioners representing 
the federal and state governments, the university, 
municipalities, Alaska Natives, and the private sec-
tor (labor and contractors), the two key features of 
the commission are as follows:
• Through its membership, the commission 
attempts to create a true IGR partnership that 
is controlled largely at the state level.
• Each commission member represents state-
wide interests, so there are no structural 
regional conflicts.
Since its inception the commission has worked 
with various state and federal agencies providing 
more than $1 billion for basic infrastructure needs 
in rural-bush Alaska, numbering some two thou-
sand projects. Currently, the commission’s budget 
is less than $10 million a year. In its peak year of 
2006 its funding topped $150 million. To try to main-
tain its former level of service, the commission is 
aggressively pursuing alternative funding. The 
needs in rural-bush areas remain extensive.
Undoubtedly, the defeat of Senator Ted Ste-
vens in November 2008 impacted the funding for 
the commission. Other causes of reduced funding 
include President Obama’s spending cuts in Alaska, 
including those to health care construction over-
seen by the commission. Beginning in late 2012, 
the commission became embroiled in a controversy 
regarding alleged mismanagement and finan-
cial irregularities. This involved calls by federal 
investigators to abolish the commission. However, 
Alaska’s three-member congressional delegation 
sought an investigation to get to the root of the alle-
gation and together with the commission’s mem-
bers fought hard to save the commission. 
Then, in August 2015, the commission got a 
major boost in responsibility and funding from Pres-
ident Ohama’s visit to Alaska, which focused largely 
on climate change. The president announced that 
the commission will be the lead agency in a three-
year project to look at the environmentally threat-
ened communities in Alaska and to decide whether 
they need relocating or not. So the commission’s 
continued existence is assured through 2019 and 
most likely beyond. 
Source: Developed by Krag Johnsen, former Denali Commission staffer, Kevin Ritchie, author of Chapter 18, and 
Anthony Nakazawa.  
(especially for capital projects) comes from the state. This rural-bush funding is, in part, 
because of the lack of any tax base in rural-bush areas, but mainly because of Alaska’s oil 
bonanza since the late 1970s. 
From a political perspective, these special circumstances mean that the IGR power 
dynamic has elements in Alaska not found in IGR politics of most states. Of particular 
341
FeDeraL INFLUeNCeS aND INterGOVerNMeNtaL reLatIONS
note is the political dimension in Alaska resulting from the dual IGR system and the 
existence of Native governments. This dual IGR system includes the particularly thorny 
political issues of Native sovereignty and subsistence. The number of Alaska Natives 
in rural-bush areas means they are able to elect Native legislators and others who push 
Native issues, which also affects the state-local IGR relationship in Alaska. To some extent 
the federal Indian Gaming Regulatory Act of 1990, allowing tribes to set up casinos, has 
increased Native American-state IGR in states like Idaho, New Mexico, and Oregon, but 
not in Alaska. This is primarily because Alaska has virtually no “Indian Lands,” which is 
a prerequisite to the establishment of Native casinos under federal law.34 
There is no data available to make comparisons between Alaska and other states 
regarding the funding relationships between the states and their local governments. 
However, because of the dependence of many Alaska local governments on state funding, 
it is likely that Alaska’s municipalities lobby state government more intensely than local 
governments in other states. The dependence of many local Alaska economies on state 
employment and capital budget funds contributes to the general dependence of Alaska 
local governments on state government with consequent effects on the state-local politi-
cal power dynamic. 
 FIGUre 10.2 
tracking State Dependence on Federal Funds
prOpOrtION OF State eXpeNDItUreS COMING FrOM FeDeraL FUNDS,
BY preSIDeNtIaL aDMINIStratION
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The state dependency rate is a measure of how dependent states are on federal funds. Among recent presi-
dential administrations, only the Reagan administration saw a significant decrease in the rate.
Source: Calculations based on U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Centers for Medicare and 
Medicaid Services, National Health Expenditures by Type of Service and Source of Funds, Calendar Years 
1960–2006, at http://www.cm.hhs.gov/NationalHealthExpendData/down loads/nhe2006.zip; and U.S. Depart-
ment of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, National Income and Product Accounts Tables, Table 3.3, 
at http://bea.gov/national/nipaweb/SelectTable.asp?Selected=N#S3.
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8. CONCLUSION: THE BALANCE SHEET OF CONSTRAINTS, CONFLICTS,  
    AND BENEFITS AND THE PERSISTENCE OF POLITICAL RHETORIC 
IGR is clearly an important and integral part of Alaska government, politics, and pol-
icy making. This is the case with all aspects of IGR: state government’s involvement with 
its local governments, Native governments, other states, and interactions with the federal 
government and with foreign governments. The most significant relationship with other 
governments, however, is Alaska’s relationship with the federal government. The major 
significance of this relationship since the Alaska Purchase of 1867, and particularly since 
statehood, brings into sharp relief several characteristics of Alaska politics—the signifi-
cant role of external economic and political forces, the all-pervasive importance of gov-
ernment, and the political culture of pragmatic dependent individualism often coupled 
with the myths and contradictions of Alaska’s political discourse. Alaska’s dual IGR sys-
tem illustrates the Alaska political characteristic of the prominent role of Alaska Natives.
The effect of the Alaska-federal relationship on the state and the various segments of 
its population is not a simple one and certainly not all negative, as some vocal Alaskans 
believe. The various attitudes toward the federal government among Alaskans and their 
elected and appointed officials are shaped by the level of knowledge of the role of the fed-
eral government and a complex set of values, including views on the role of government 
and perception of the degree to which various segments of Alaska society benefit or lose 
as a result of federal actions. These attitudes range across a spectrum from negative to 
positive and various combinations in between. For the state and its inhabitants as a whole, 
however, the positive definitely outweighs the negative. Not only is Alaska’s standard of 
living higher because of federal monies flowing to the state, but the state receives more 
funds per capita than almost any other state. This means, in effect, that many of the other 
forty-nine states are subsidizing Alaska. 
This is not to say that many of the conflicts in which Alaska’s state government and its 
citizens find themselves with the federal government are not justified—sometimes “fed-
eral overreach” is real. It is also true that many Alaskans and the state are constrained to 
their detriment by actions or inactions of the federal government. Even so, it is important 
to bear two points in mind. First, as in all IGR and in politics in general, Alaska’s relation-
ship with the federal government is a political trade-off, in which both sides have legal 
and political obligations and no side gets all it wants. Second, like Alaska’s state govern-
ment, the federal government is not a monolith. Its three branches, particularly its exec-
utive branch agencies, are often at odds with each other. One branch or agency may well 
favor a policy that benefits a certain segment in Alaska while another branch or agency 
may disagree. So it is both inaccurate and unjustifiable to brand the federal government 
at large with all actions considered detrimental to the state and its citizens. 
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Yet many Alaskans and their politicians are not concerned with such distinctions, 
often for ideological reasons but sometimes because they do not understand the role 
of the federal government or do not want to acknowledge it because, as Tony Knowles 
explains in Box 10.2, federal bashing makes for good politics in many circles in Alaska. So 
federal bashing is likely to continue to be part of Alaska’s political rhetoric for some time 
to come. This can be more or less harmless when it stays at the level of rhetoric. When 
rhetoric is combined with ideology, however, the combination can work to deny Alaska 
control of its affairs by ceding responsibilities to the federal government. That not only 
goes counter to the intentions of Alaska’s founders, it can also be detrimental to Alaskans 
in general. This could be particularly detrimental to the state in the post–Ted Stevens era 
in which Alaska does not have the political influence it once had in Washington, D.C.  
ENDNOTES
1 This chapter draws, in part, on Clive S. Thomas, “Intergovernmental Relations in Alaska: Development, 
Dynamics and Lessons,” The Northern Review [Special Issue on Central-Local Relations in the 
North], no. 23 (Summer, 2001): 17–37.
2 David, C. Nice and Patricia Fredericksen, The Politics of Intergovernmental Relations, 2nd ed. (Chicago: 
Nelson-Hall Publishers, 1995), 2.
3 U.S. Census Bureau, Newsroom Archives, August 30, 2012, at: www.census.gov/newsroom/releases/
archives/governments/cb12-161.html.
4 Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie Tribal Government, 522 U.S. 520 (1998).
5 Public Land Ownership by State, at www.nrcm.org/documents/publiclandownership.pdf. 
6 Clive S. Thomas, ed., Politics and Public Policy in the Contemporary American West (Albuquerque: 
University of New Mexico Press, 1991), 15. 
7 U.S. Census Bureau, 2010 Census: PL 94-171 Redistricting Data, at http://live.laborstats.alaska.gov/cen/
redistr.cfm, and Urban and Rural Classification for Alaska, at http://labor.alaska.gov/research/cen-
sus/urbrur.htm. 
8 In particular, Chapter 9 on the Native political economy considers the formal aspects of federalism 
and IGR regarding Native governments. Federal-state IGR politics is also considered in Chapter 
18 on local government, including some reference to relations with Native governments as well as 
state-local IGR.
9 Gerald A. McBeath and Thomas A. Morehouse, Alaska Politics and Government (Lincoln: University 
of Nebraska Press, 1994), 42.
10 The Indian Reorganization Act and its application to Alaska are discussed more fully in Section 1 of 
Chapter 9 on Alaska Natives. 
11 See also Chapter 9 for details on the provisions of ANCSA and its pros and cons. 
12 See Box 2.3 in Chapter 2.
13 For attitudes in the western states toward the federal government in these years, see Richard H. Foster, 
“The Federal Government and the West,” in, Thomas, Politics and Public Policy in the Contemporary 
American West.
344
ALASKA POLITICS AND PUBLIC POLICY
14 Alaska Statehood commission advisory vote, at http://ballotpedia.org/wiki/index.php/
Alaska_Statehood_Commission_Advisory_Vote_%281980%29.
15 See the provisions of the initiative at http://ballotpedia.org/wiki/index.php/Alaska_State_Ownership_ 
of_Federal_Land_Initiative_%281982%29.
16 Alaska Statehood Commission, More Perfect Union: A Preliminary Report (Juneau, AK: 1982); Foster, 
“The Federal Government and the West,” 83; and McBeath and Morehouse, Alaska Politics and 
Government, 87. 
17 On the Wickersham, see editorial, Anchorage Daily Times, January 29, 1972.
18 Malcolm B. Roberts, ed., Going Up in Flames: The Promises and Pledges of Alaska Statehood Under 
Attack (Anchorage: Alaska Pacific University Press, for Commonwealth North, 1990). For a review 
of the book see Journal of the West 31, no. 2 (April 1992): 116.
19 Walter J. Hickel, “Feds have Abused Their Compact with Alaska,” Anchorage Daily News, January 3, 
2009. 
20 See Chapter 6 on the Alaska economy and Chapter 8 on state revenues, esp. Table 8.1, Chapter 12 on 
the role of government, Table 12.1, and Scott Goldsmith and Eric Larson, “Federal Spending and 
Revenues in Alaska” (Anchorage: Institute of Social and Economic Research , ISER, University of 
Alaska, 2003). 
21 A fuller analysis of the place of IGR in several development and resources issues is provided in 
Chapters 21 through 24. 
22 Interview with former Governor Tony Knowles, by Clive Thomas and Anthony Nakazawa, June 2, 
2008.
23 Julie Kitka, Presentation to Commonwealth North on April 20, 1999. 
24 Julia O’Malley, “Feds We Loath You, Please Send Money,” Anchorage Daily News, January 22, 2010. 
25 Interview with former Governor Tony Knowles. 
26 Charles Homans, “State of Dependence: Ted Stevens’s Alaska Problem—and Ours,” The Washington 
Monthly, November 2007, 13.
27 Ibid., 17. 
28 Ibid., 15.
29 Liz Ruskin, ”Walker’s appointee for top DC job? No one,” Alaska News Nightly, Alaska Public Radio 
Network (APRN), November 12, 2015. 
30 See Chapter 30, Box 30.1, for a perspective on what Stevens’s defeat and death may mean for Alaska’s 
economic and political future. 
31 See Chapter 8 on state revenues, Figure 8.8, for a comparison of congressional earmarks for Alaska 
in 2009 and 2010.
32 Carl Hulse, “Senate Won’t Allow Earmarks in Spending Bills,” New York Times [The Caucus: the Political 
and Government of the Times], February 1, 2011; Patti Epler, “Murkowski Wants Alaska Prepared for 
‘World without Earmarks,’” Alaska Dispatch, February 24, 2011; and Peter Granitz, “Congress may 
Lift So-called Earmark Ban Next Year,” Alaska News Nightly (APRN), August 21, 2012. 
33 Figure 10.2 goes only to 2005 and not to 2015. This is for two reasons. First, there is a time lag with 
such data that is often as long as four years. More importantly, the stimulus package money that 
came to the states in 2009 and 2010 as a result of the major national and international economic 
345
FEDERAL INFLUENCES AND INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS
downturn in 2008 and beyond was an aberration and distorts the general trend. Thus, we end 
the comparison at 2005. However, judging by the close to fifty years covered by the figure, this 
upward trend in state dependence on federal funds is likely to continue regardless of the rhetoric 
of national budget cuts and one- or two-year aberrations in funding. 
34 G. Larry Mayes and William Taggart, “Intergovernmental Relations and Native American Gaming: A 
Case Study on the Emergence of a New Intergovernmental Participant,” The American Review of 
Public Administration, 35, no. 1 (2005): 74–93.
